Discussion on the ILWU Contract
A Critique of David Bacon’s Corpwatch Article, “West Coast Dockworkers: Victory in the Face of the Bush Doctrine”
by Jack Heyman
The author is an elected business agent of Local 10 of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU), and has been prominent in calling for a “No” vote on the proposed ILWU contract. His article, posted on the Internet in early January 2003, has been copy-edited for Labor Standard.
David Bacon’s Corpwatch piece on the recent ILWU contract negotiations [reprinted below] begins and ends with the ominous role of government intervention against trade unions. At no point in the article is Bacon critical of the trade union bureaucracy’s role in acquiescing to government intimidation.
Bacon opens his article with Reagan’s devastating crushing of the PATCO air controllers’ union strike of 1981, not mentioning that the strikers were betrayed by the AFL-CIO bureaucracy’s failure to mobilize to defend airport picket lines. He closes by citing Bush’s use of “national security” as a club not just against the ILWU but possibly against other unions as well.
Bacon never raises the key question: If a militant union like the ILWU, with powerful pacts with the Teamsters and the East Coast ILA [International Longshoremen’s Association] and with international dockworker connections, doesn’t take a stand against joint government/employer coercion and turn the tide, then who can?
Bacon has written for the ILWU’s newspaper The Dispatcher on international issues before, and he has generally done a good job. However, in an article on the dockworkers in the British port of Felixstowe, following the defeat of the Liverpool dockers’ struggle, he once again displayed a similar lack of depth in failing to criticize the trade union bureaucracy.
The Liverpool dispute was perhaps the most significant dockworkers’ struggle in years. Tragically, support for the bold Liverpool dockers within Britain and internationally was aggressively cut off and isolated by Bill Morris, general secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union. Felixstowe, ostensibly a union port, lent no support during the Liverpool struggle. Neither of these points saw the light of day in Bacon’s Dispatcher article.
Bacon misses a critical point throughout his Corpwatch article, which is that the present ILWU leadership has departed from our union’s principled legacy of opposing repressive laws passed under the guise of “national security” and opposing U.S. imperial wars against third world countries. The ILWU opposed Taft-Hartley since its beginning in 1947, opposed Democratic President Truman and his invoking of it, and successfully fought its anti-Communist clause directed against union officers all the way to the Supreme Court. We also fought government waterfront screening during the McCarthy period, which mainly affected reds and blacks.
ILWU Leadership Silent on Iraq War
Now for the first time the ILWU has a leadership which has remained silent on the question of war against Iraq, seeks to “improve” oppressive legislation like the Port Maritime Security Act rather than oppose it, and paints this concessionary contract as a “victory.” The ILWU, under its legendary leader from the 1930s, Harry Bridges, never negotiated a contract under Taft-Hartley, not in 1948 and not in 1971.
In his rush to proclaim “victory” in what is an employer-imposed contract, as some in the ILWU leadership have admitted, Bacon makes the mistaken assertion that the agreement was “overwhelmingly ratified”, when in fact the coastwide vote has not yet taken place in all ports, much less been tallied.
Two of the big lies being told in this dispute are (1) that the West Coast ports were shut down by an ILWU strike not a PMA (employer) lockout; and (2) that this tentative agreement is a “landmark victory” simply because the ILWU was able to get a good benefits package. But a labor contract is much more than benefits. The truth is that labor cannot negotiate a good contract with a Taft-Hartley gun pointed at its head or in a “barbed wire straitjacket,” as Bacon puts it.
This was posed as a “technology” contract by the employers united in the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA). Yet, the employers already have the ability under Section 15 of the contract to introduce new technology. This contract is not about technology. It is about jurisdiction, protection of the ILWU’s work, traditional and new, clerk and longshore. The PMA and Bush are testing the waters to determine labor’s resolve to defend itself.
Bacon claims that the “definitive battle…[of] technology for jobs—was not fought to a conclusion this time.” His earlier writings on this struggle were more accurate when he asserted that this was a “defining moment” in the labor movement.
Even before the coastwide contract ratification vote employers are already displaying their hubris in the port of Oakland: provoking and trying to fire ILWU mechanics at the new Hanjin terminal twice; at the APL terminal, cutting longshore jobs and trying to “contract out” ILWU chassis mechanic work; and having management handle ship mooring lines at terminal after terminal. These kinds of attacks are happening at other ports too.
As Bacon correctly points out, maritime employers, shippers of the West Coast Waterfront Coalition, and the government set up a secret White House task force in a collaborative attempt to coerce the ILWU through a litany of repressive state measures to accept PMA’s contractual terms and conditions.
What Bacon leaves out is that because the new ILWU leadership has bought into Bush’s “national security” ruse, they never even considered a strike or organized national and international actions on the docks in support of the ILWU. Their conventional wisdom fears that longshoremen would have been characterized as defiant, greedy, and unpatriotic Americans sabotaging Bush’s holy “war against terrorism.”
Rather than swim against the political stream, which the ILWU has always done best, we were faced with a timetable orchestrated by the PMA. We were locked out and then hit with Taft-Hartley during the busy shipping season. Now it’s the slack season, and as the war with Iraq approaches, our union officials are working overtime trying to sell an imposed contract as a “victory.”
It’s time to draw the line. If we wait until the July 2008 contract expiration date Bush, if reelected, will still be in office, or maybe some “wannabe Republican” Democrat like Truman. We, longshore workers, should reject this contract and send our Negotiating Committee back, this time to negotiate with some muscle by lining up concrete support in the U.S. and internationally. This was done on a small scale in the Neptune Jade campaign in support of the Liverpool dockers. We can do it again on a larger scale. Bush cannot initiate a war on two fronts simultaneously, his I.Q. notwithstanding.
Union Compares Negotiations to a “Barbed Wire Straight Jacket”
by David Bacon
Special to Corpwatch
January 2, 2003
[David Bacon is a print, radio, and photo journalist who covers labor issues.]
San Francisco—Not since 1981, when President Ronald Reagan broke the air traffic controllers strike, have U.S. labor relations gone through such a profound sea change as they did during recent West Coast dockworkers contract negotiations. The Bush administration’s overt, and behind-the-scenes, intervention on the side of management led dockers to compare recent negotiations to bargaining in a “barbed wire straitjacket.”
Although union membership overwhelmingly ratified an agreement reached with the world’s largest shipping companies, the circumstances overshadowing the talks were a clear warning shot to both the dockworkers and the rest of the U.S. labor movement.
“Given what we went through over the last six months, including the lockout of workers in every port, and then the invocation of the Taft-Hartley Act, we’re glad we were able to reach an agreement at all,” explained Steve Stallone, communications director for the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU). “So the fact that we were able to make progress on all three issues important to us was a big achievement.”
Longshore workers went into negotiations last June with three goals in mind, according to Stallone. They wanted to preserve their healthcare benefits in the face of demands by the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) that they pay part of skyrocketing costs. They wanted increases in their pensions. And they wanted to ensure that employer proposals to implement new technology wouldn’t result in the loss of jobs.
The new agreement preserves longshore workers’ health benefits with no co-payment by workers, at an estimated present cost to employers of $220 million annually. By the end of the six-year agreement, that cost is estimated to rise to $500 million. The pension settlement will increase benefits by 60% over the same period. “This is the biggest pension increase in the history of our union,” Stallone pointed out.
But both provisions came at a cost. The PMA will implement a new system for tracking container movement using scanners and other computer-aided devices, replacing the system under which longshore clerks manually enter information into the shippers’ database. That will eventually eliminate about 400 jobs, out of a total clerk workforce on the West Coast of 1,200. No clerk will actually lose his or her job, since the contract guarantees 40 hours of work a week for the career of every current member. But in the future, the number of jobs covered will be reduced. In return, the union was able to win jurisdiction over jobs planning the movement of containers on trains and in yards on the waterfront. Those jobs were previously outsourced.
Employers wanted to keep workers using the new technology out of the union entirely. Workers in these categories also included vessel planners, who tell the cranes where to put containers on the ships, and clerical workers in company offices. A few hundred of them have already joined the longshore union in many ports, attracted by its high wage rates. To make up for the potential job loss among the clerks, the union sought to include them in all ports by extending its jurisdiction. Now it will have to organize them.
“There are problems with the settlement, as you might expect from any contract negotiated under the gun of Taft-Hartley,” Stallone noted. “The wage differential between the highest- and lowest-paid increased, which we’ve always fought against.” In addition, there is now a new differential between the wages of drivers in the huge container cranes, and those operating cranes used to load and unload bulk cargo. “That opens the door to what happened to the International Longshoremens’ Association (which represents dockers on the East and Gulf coasts), who now have separate contracts for each category.”
The six-year agreement is also unusual. Unions normally seek to limit contracts to two or three years, since inflation can spiral out of control, taking large chunks out of paychecks. The ILWU agreed to the long term in order to space the large pension increase out over a number of years. The expiration of the agreement in 2008 also means that the union might avoid renegotiating it under Bush, even if he’s reelected in 2004.
The Bush Administration Intervenes
The bargaining strategy of the Pacific Maritime Association rested on removing the union’s ability to exert pressure during negotiations to protect wages and conditions on the docks. With the Bush administration in office, now was the time, employers believed, to take their best shot.
For the PMA, the Taft-Hartley injunction was a step in a well-ordered scenario that unfolded with inexorable precision. Among other restrictions, the Taft-Hartley Act gives the Attorney General the power to obtain an 80-day injunction against any strike deemed a peril to “national health or safety.”
Before negotiations began in June, the shippers and some of their biggest customers, including The Gap, Target, Mattel, and Home Depot, organized the West Coast Waterfront Coalition. Together, they held secret meetings with a Bush administration task force headed by White House adviser Carlos Bonilla.
Once negotiations began, Homeland Secretary Tom Ridge and representatives of the Department of Labor phoned ILWU President Jim Spinosa, warning him that the administration would view any strike or interruption of work on the docks as a threat to national security. They threatened to invoke the Taft-Hartley Act, to use the military to replace striking workers, to place the waterfront under the Railway Labor Act (making a strike virtually illegal), and removing the union’s ability to negotiate a single labor agreement covering all ports on the coast.
The ILWU nimbly avoided being provoked into a strike, but finally, at the peak-shipping season, employers locked out their own workers. The Maritime Association accused the union of organizing an alleged work slowdown. According to the Journal of Commerce, however, 30% more cargo was crossing the docks than last year—the greatest volume in history. In fact, the speedup on the docks was so intense that the accident rate shot up, costing the lives of five longshoremen in 2002. When the union told its members to work at a safe speed, the PMA called it a slowdown.
Once the dockers were locked out, employers then demanded Bush invoke Taft-Hartley. The administration’s legal brief before Judge Alsup voiced a startling new philosophy, elaborated by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfield. He held that all commercial cargo could be considered important to the military, not just specifically goods intended for military use abroad. Any stoppage on the docks, therefore, was a threat to national security.
The use of national security as a pretext for injunctions—and even militarizing the workplace and replacing strikers—could affect any union. Instead of defining a threat to national security in terms of vital life-dependent services, this use of national security defines it as economic. Any strike halting the continued operation of an industry or a large profitable enterprise could be defined as such a threat, and made illegal. PMA based its strategy on this new interpretation.
At the beginning of October, the men and women of the docks went back to work, after having been locked out for 12 days. They returned, not voluntarily, as they had offered to do from the beginning, but under the federal injunction won by the shipping corporations. Bargaining continued for another month, therefore, under the Taft-Hartley Act’s 80-day “cooling off” period.
On the surface, it seems incomprehensible that the association would need a federal order to open the gates of the closed terminals. After all, they’d shut them themselves, and could have opened them at any time. But the resumption of work was never really the issue. Instead, the PMA wanted two things. It wanted a guarantee that dockers would be forced to continue unloading ships through the peak-shipping season, when goods traveling from the sweatshops of the eastern Pacific Rim are en route to stores for the Christmas rush. And it wanted to make the union so vulnerable that it would be unable to put any pressure on employers during negotiations.
After work resumed, the PMA continued to accuse the union of slowing the pace as a means of threatening to invoke further federal intervention. “The ILWU is playing games with the U.S. economy, and inflicting economic pain and hardship on scores of companies and their employees,” said Joe Miniace, PMA director. “Given the extreme urgency of keeping the goods moving through our ports, I cannot fathom why the union would deliberately take these slowdown actions.”
Jobs and Technology in the Balance
Longshore wages were never the primary issue. The hourly rate on the docks, prior to the new contract, ranged from $27.68 to $33.48—about the same as a union plumber or electrician. These are good wages in terms of the U.S. industrial average, at a time when such jobs are rapidly disappearing from the economy. But the shipping companies never claimed poverty, and in fact are making large profits.
At the root of the dispute was the PMA’s decision to try to end an arrangement that successfully allowed the introduction of advanced technology onto the docks for the last 40 years. In 1960, the union agreed that employers could introduce the first container cranes, the giant machines that now move cargo containers on and off the huge ships built specially to carry them. Even though this change cost the jobs of tens of thousands of West Coast dockers, the union agreed that so long as its members did the new jobs technology produced, it would not try to stop it.
Over the coming two decades, the companies want to automate shipping far beyond the use of automated scanners and tracking devices. In their vision of the future, cranes and dockside machines will eventually be operated by remote control, perhaps by people miles away from the wharves. That day, however, is further in the future than the expiration of the present contract. The definitive battle to determine whether the framework of the 1960 agreement still holds—technology for jobs—was not fought to a conclusion this time around.
But the Bush administration, which also used back-to-work orders against employees at Northwest and United Airlines in 2001, has now established a clear precedent. Interruptions of economic activity, the new doctrine says, are a threat to national security. As a result, the entire terrain of labor negotiations has shifted dramatically in favor of business, and many other unions may find themselves facing federal intervention in the months to come.